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EXAGGERATED RISK: PROSPECT THEORY AND PROBABILITY 
WEIGHTING IN RISKY CHOICE 
 
 
Abstract 
In five experiments we studied precautionary decisions where participants decided 
whether or not to buy insurance with specified cost against an undesirable event with 
specified probability and cost. We compared the risks taken for precautionary 
decisions with those taken for equivalent monetary gambles. Fitting these data to 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory we find that the weighting function 
required to model precautionary decisions differs from that required for monetary 
gambles. This result indicates a failure of the descriptive invariance axiom of 
expected utility theory. For precautionary decisions people overweighted small, 
medium-sized and moderately large probabilities - they exaggerated risks. This effect 
is not anticipated by prospect theory or experience-based decision research (Hertwig, 
Weber, Erev & Barron, 2004). We find evidence that exaggerated risk is caused by 
the accessibility of events in memory: the weighting function varies as a function of 
the accessibility of events. This suggests that people’s experiences of events “leak” 
into decisions even when risk information is explicitly provided. Our findings 
highlight a need to investigate how variation in decision content produces variation in 
preferences for risk. 
 
Keywords: probability, accessibility, risk exaggeration, frequency, precautionary 
decisions 
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A virtue of good theory is that it is general; theories that predict a wide range of 
events have obvious merit. Several prominent theories of decision-making achieve 
this objective by proposing that all decisions can be modeled with the same generic 
representation.  So it is that the leading normative (e.g., von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) of decision-making share a common 
representational assumption: people’s risk preferences and decisions under risk and 
uncertainty are task-independent. For example, these theories assume that all 
decisions under risk or uncertainty can be represented as gambles with monetary 
amounts representing the outcomes. Although the nature of the content area being 
contemplated (e.g., decisions about health or money or jobs) may influence 
judgments of the degree of risk and benefit (cf. Slovic, 1987) most prominent 
decision theories assume that, once the basic input values for likelihoods and costs are 
determined, decision-making with risky prospects is not influenced by any factors 
associated with this content and is independent of the decision-task. For example, the 
decision whether or not to insure my luggage worth £500 for a cost of £5 where the 
risk of loss is 1% is identical to the decision to pay £5 or take a gamble where I have 
a 1% chance of losing £500. 
Here, we investigate the validity of this assumption by studying the factors that 
affect people’s reactions to presented probabilities in described real-world decision 
prospects. Research studying people’s decisions under risk using choices between 
gambles implies that decision-makers weight the probability of risky events in 
characteristic ways that deviate from normative expected utility theory (axiomatized 
by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Specifically, when making risky decisions, 
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people overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and large 
probabilities; breaching rational agents’ rules, people’s decisions weight probabilities 
non-linearly (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 - see also 
Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Wakker, 1995; 
Wakker, 2003).   
The nonlinear impact of probability on decisions is exemplified by the fourfold 
pattern of risk preferences predicted by Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Thus, because people overweight small probabilities, both low 
probability gains and low probability losses loom large relative to certain payoffs 
with the same expected value. This results in risk seeking for gains and risk aversion 
for losses at low probability - for example, people are tempted to buy lottery tickets 
(seeking unlikely gains) and insurance (attempting to avoid unlikely losses). Also, as 
people underweight moderate and large probabilities, they show a contrasting risk 
aversion for high probability gains and risk seeking for high probability losses 
compared to certain payoffs with the same expected value. 
Risky Decision-Making and Precautions 
Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) studies reporting under- and over-weighting of 
probability measured respondents’ binary choices between monetary gambles. 
However, there is some reason to believe that people’s choices about monetary 
gambles may not correspond with their preponderance for risk in situations where 
they need to consider decisions regarding other kinds of risks. Several studies have 
reported increased attractiveness of decision prospects when framed as insurance 
decisions; specifically, there is evidence for a context effect in which prospects 
presented in an insurance context are judged with greater risk aversion than 
mathematically identical choices presented as standard gambles (Connor, 1996; 
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Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Schoemaker & Kunreuther, 1979; Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, 1977). This finding has prompted the suggestion 
that people have a relatively favorable attitude towards insurance because, unlike 
gambling, insurance is viewed as an investment as well as a means of risk reduction 
(Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1987). 
Given the suggestion that there may be differences in people’s decision behavior 
as a function of the type of risks they may be contemplating, we propose that there is 
a need to be sensitive to possibly different psychological types of risky decision.  
Accordingly, we identify and define precautionary decisions and behavior as those 
occasions where people aim to minimize or avoid risks by taking protective actions 
and where the benefits of taking precautions exemplify risk-averse behavior (Baron et 
al., 2000; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980). Protective behavior and decisions in the 
face of risk have been the subject of a number of studies (e.g., Baron, Hershey & 
Kunreuther, 2000; Huber & Huber, 2008; Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros & Kunreuther, 
1993; Kunreuther, 2001; Slovic et al., 1987; Wakker, Thaler & Tversky, 1997) and 
yet, to our knowledge, no study has attempted to asses the probability-weighting 
function for precautionary decisions in the same way as has been done for choices 
with monetary gambles. 
In this paper we present evidence for a dissimilarity between the pattern of risk 
preferences with precautionary decisions and risk preferences with monetary gambles 
indicating that the process of decision-making in the two cases may be very different. 
Apart from the empirical evidence there are - a priori - strong reasons to expect that 
there might be differences in the way people evaluate a choice between two monetary 
gambles and the way that they might consider adopting precautions against risks, 
such as whether to buy earthquake insurance. While a choice between monetary 
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gambles may present a real dilemma, the gambles themselves typically do not have 
any features that have any meaning for the decision maker - other than their essential 
structural properties (probability of winning/losing and amount to win/lose). By 
contrast, hazards that one might insure against have all sorts of other aspects 
associated with them other than the probability of winning/losing and the amount to 
win/lose. Decisions associated with insurance and gambling can be seen as 
qualitatively different from each other. For example, for insurance decisions - but not 
for monetary gambles - factors such as individual experience of real-world frequency 
(e.g., decisions made by analogy to previously encountered problems Gilboa & 
Schmeidler, 2001; Stewart, Chater & Brown, 2006), accessibility to particular 
information in memory (Koriat, 1993, 1995; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) and past 
subjective experience with anxiety or fear (Kunreuther, 2001; Viscusi & Chesson, 
1999), arguably all result in support for precautionary action. Relevant to our 
concerns here, we suggest that the accessibility of information influences the decision 
to purchase or not purchase a particular insurance product. We see no evidence that 
the same factor applies to decisions about monetary gambles. The issue is of 
considerable importance because, to the extent that decisions made with monetary 
gambles differ from those made for insurance, the goal of studying monetary 
(gamble) decisions as a basis for explaining all varieties of human decisions is called 
into question. 
Experiment 1 
We assume that, because they are relatively abstract, monetary gamble tasks do not 
prompt the same history of experience and range of associations as typical real-world 
protective tasks (e.g., precautionary decisions). For instance, according to the 
normative theory, a set of simple binary gamble choices of the form “p chance of x, 
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otherwise y” should evoke the same preference order across different decision 
domains. Accordingly, a 1% chance of losing £300 or a sure loss of £60 and a1% 
chance of an insurable event of losing £300 or paying £60 for insurance are 
equivalent prospects. However, we believe that there are grounds to suspect that 
behavior in monetary gamble situations may not correspond with precautionary risk 
behavior. In particular, we suspect that people might be more risk averse when 
contemplating the probabilities and losses associated with options in precautionary 
decision-making. Accordingly, Experiment 1 was designed to compare the pattern of 
people’s risk preferences in protective (insurance) decision-making with the pattern 
exhibited for monetary gambles and also to see if insurance decision-making can be 
modeled within the classic framework of Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992; Tversky & Fox, 1995). 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 60 students (33 female, 27 male) from the University of 
Warwick. Mean age was 21 (SD = 2.43). They took part individually and received a 
payment of £5. 
Stimuli and Equipment. 
An interactive computer program for binary decision-making was used. Four types 
of binary decision-making situation (scenario), each corresponding with one of four 
experimental conditions, were included: gamble gain (monetary gamble with a sure 
gain versus a gain with a given probability), gamble loss (monetary gamble with a 
sure loss versus a loss with a given probability), insurance gain (a sure rebate  - i.e. a 
refund on an insurance premium - versus a rebate with a given probability) and 
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insurance loss (insurance against loss of luggage versus a loss of luggage with a given 
probability). 
In a first session, participants had to indicate a preference between a probabilistic 
outcome and a sure outcome in a series of 308 trials. The trials were created by 
combining 4 monetary amounts (£50, £100, £200, £400) for the probabilistic 
outcomes with 11 probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99) and 
each of these combinations was presented with one of 7 monetary amounts for the 
sure outcome (logarithmically spaced between £1 and the amount of the probabilistic 
outcome), producing 4×11×7 = 308 combinations. Using a method similar to that 
used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), binary-choice prospects (a choice between a 
probabilistic and a sure outcome) were presented. The following algorithm was used 
for each participant: (1) randomly select one of the four monetary amounts; (2) for 
this monetary amount randomly select a probability level; (3) randomly present each 
of the seven sure monetary amounts; (4) go back to (2) unless all probability levels 
have been sampled in which case go back to (1) and repeat until all prospects have 
been presented. 
As in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), participants’ certainty equivalent (CE) 
estimates were based on the sure outcomes chosen in the task: the midpoint between 
the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value in the prospects. To obtain a 
more refined estimate of the CE, in a second session, values of people’s preferences 
were linearly spaced between a value 25% higher than the lowest amount accepted in 
the first set (session) and a value 25% lower than the highest amount rejected. The CE 
of a prospect was estimated as the midpoint between the lowest accepted value of the 
sure outcome and the highest rejected value in the second set of choices. 
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Design and Procedure. 
Previous research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) used a repeated measures design 
with loss and gain scenarios mixed in a single series (simultaneous within subjects 
design, Keppel, 1991). Results obtained under these conditions could be an artifact of 
the design. Specifically a contrast effect may result (Keppel 1991), that is either an 
effect becomes more pronounced compared to an independent measures design, or a 
spurious effect could occur, which would not occur with an independent measures 
design. In order to avoid this pitfall, we used a 2×2 between-subjects design, with the 
following independent variables: decision-making task (gamble, insurance) and 
decision-making domain (gain, loss). There were 15 participants in each experimental 
condition.  
At the start of the program, task instructions and then an example scenario with 
illustrative choices were presented. On each trial, participants were asked to consider 
a presented scenario and choose one of two options, for example: 
Insurance Loss Scenario: 
A. 1% chance of losing your luggage which is worth £400 
or 
B. Buying insurance at a cost of £20 to insure against the loss of your luggage; 
Gamble Loss Scenario: 
A. 1% chance of losing £400 
or 
B. A sure loss of £20; 
Insurance Gain Scenario: 
A. 1% chance of winning a insurance rebate of £400 
or 
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B. A guaranteed insurance rebate of £20; 
Gamble Gain Scenario: 
A. 1% chance of winning £400 
or 
B. A sure gain of £20  
Participants completed a series of 308 trials of binary decisions with one of the 
four types of scenario within each of two sessions. 
Results and Discussion 
The results section is organized as follows: first we present an analysis of the risk 
preferences of the respondents. Next we present analysis of the CE measures and 
finally we present the result of our attempts to fit the observed decisions to the 
Prospect theory probability weighting function. All statistical tests reported in this 
paper used a significance level of .05 unless indicated otherwise. 
Risk Preference 
In both the insurance and gamble gain scenarios, rates of risk-seeking choices 
(where CE exceeds expected value) decreased from about 80% to about 10% as the 
probability of the risky prospect increased (see Table 1 and Figure 2). All participants 
in the gain conditions were predominantly risk averse. A two-way ANOVA 
confirmed this result for gain scenarios, with a significant effect of probability range 
(= .01, ≤ .1 and ≥ .5) on risk preference, F (2, 56) = 149.39, p < .001, very large effect 
size ε2 = .77, but the effect of task (gamble, insurance) and the interaction effect of 
range and task were not significant, both F < 1. In the insurance-loss condition there 
were fewer risk-seeking choices - ranging from 0% to 40% - across the different 
probabilities of prospects compared to the gamble-loss condition - where the 
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proportion of risk-seeking choices ranged from 10% to 83% (see Table 2 and Figure 
2).  
In the two loss scenarios, rates of risk-averse choices decreased with increasing 
probability of risky prospects, but more so for the gamble-loss scenario - from 90% to 
17% - than for the insurance-loss scenario - from 100% to 60% (see Table 2 and 
Figure 2). A two-way ANOVA confirmed this result; there were significant effects on 
risk preference of both main effects of range, F (2, 56) = 82.12, p < .001, very large 
effect size ε2 = .62, and task, F (1, 28) = 24.39, p < .001, medium effect size ε2 = .05, 
as well as an interaction effect, F (2, 56) = 6.60, p < .001, medium effect size ε2 = .05, 
significant. Simple effect tests showed that the effect of range was significant for the 
gamble scenario, F (2, 56) = 91.74, p < .001, very large effect size ε2 = .82, and for 
the insurance scenario, F (2, 56) = 15.73, p < .001, very large effect size ε2 = .48. 
Certainty Equivalent 
The average CE estimation was based on respondents’ decisions between sure 
outcomes and probabilistic outcomes. Seven sure outcomes logarithmically spaced 
between 1 and the amount of the probabilistic outcome (£50, £100, £200, £400), each 
presented with 11 probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99), were 
paired with 1 probabilistic outcome (£50, £100, £200 or £400). For the gain scenarios 
a trend of increasing CE with amount is discernible in Figure 3. In addition, CE is 
substantially higher for the insurance loss condition (about 0.6) than for the other 
three conditions (less than 0.4). These observations were confirmed by the results of 
statistical tests. A 2×2×(4) ANOVA with independent variables task (insurance, 
gamble), type of decision domain (loss, gain), and probabilistic amount (£50, £100, 
£200, £400), showed that the following main- and interaction effects were significant: 
task, F (1, 56) = 12.46, medium effect size ε2 = .05, p < .001; domain, F (1, 56) = 
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23.20, medium to large effect size ε2 = .10, p < .001; probabilistic amount, F (3, 168) 
= 6.04, small to medium effect size ε2 = .04; task by domain, F (1, 56) = 12.11, 
medium effect size ε2 = .05, p <.001; amount by domain, F (3, 168) = 2.64, small 
effect size ε2 = .02; and amount by task by domain, F (3, 168) = 3.64, small to 
medium effect size ε2 = .03 (see also Figure 3). The interaction effect between 
amount and task, F < 1, was not significant. The three-way interaction precluded 
interpretation of main effects and two-way interactions therefore, 2×2 ANOVAs with 
independent variables task (insurance, gamble) and decision domain (loss, gain) were 
conducted as simple effect tests for each probabilistic amount (£50, £100, £200, 
£400). The effects of task, domain and the interaction effect were large and 
significant, with the largest effect size for the smallest probabilistic amount and the 
smallest effect size for the largest probabilistic amount (see Table 3 and Figure 3). 
These results demonstrate relatively high CE in the insurance loss condition, 
consistent with the notion that people are particularly risk averse for insurance losses. 
The CE analysis mirrors the analysis of people’s risk preferences: more risk-averse 
precautionary decisions than gambling decisions and higher precautionary CE than 
gambling CE. These results provide evidence for a greater propensity for 
precautionary action with insurance risks than would be inferred from responses to 
equivalent monetary gambles - what we term a protective effect. 
Probability-Weighting Function 
Numerous studies investigating preferences for monetary-prospects (e.g., Camerer 
& Ho, 1994; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992; Tversky & Fox, 1995) report evidence in favor of overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of moderate and large probabilities - resulting in an 
inverse S-shaped probability-weighting function. However, there is reason to believe 
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that people’s risky decisions across different sorts of decision are not consistent. For 
instance, a person may prefer to bet on sporting events rather than on the outcomes of 
political elections, even when the chance of winning is held constant (Heath & 
Tversky, 1991).   
Using a non-linear regression procedure, judged probabilities were modeled using 
a variation (with no constant parameters) of Gonzalez and Wu’s (1999) two-
parameter probability-weighting function (1)  
( ) ,1)(
,
ββ
β
−+
−+δ
δ
=ω
pp
pp )1(
 
and a power utility function with one free parameter of the form α= xxU )( .  
In the two parameter probability weighting function ω represents the decision 
weight given to probability p, where β represents probability discriminability 
(curvature of the function) and δ represents attractiveness (elevation of the function).  
Probability-weighting functions were fitted for each participant in all four 
experimental conditions, replicating the method adopted by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). As indicated above, respondents’ CEs were inferred from their choices 
between sure outcomes and probabilistic outcomes each presented at various levels of 
probability. In the modeling procedure we express the actual CEs as a function of 
probability, amount, and the model parameters. As in previous research (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), for the gamble gain, gamble loss and insurance gain scenarios 
small probabilities were overweighted and medium-sized and large probabilities were 
underweighted. This was confirmed by the model’s estimations of the probability 
weighting function (see Figures 1a, 1b, 1c). However, for the insurance-loss scenario, 
small, medium-sized and moderately large probabilities were overweighted and large 
probabilities were slightly underweighted (see Figure 1d).  
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We fitted the functions for each participant and then analyzed the effect of the 
independent variables on the model parameters and the error - in each case, 
minimizing the summed squared error between actual CEs and predicted CEs. Mean 
values (SD) of model parameters were < 1 for probability discriminability (β) 
[gamble gain: 0.60 (0.24); gamble loss: 0.72 (0.28); insurance gain: 0.63 (0.13)], < 1 
for attractiveness (δ) [gamble gain: 0.49 (0.35); gamble loss: 0.79 (0.46); insurance 
gain: 0.63 (0.26)] and (almost) equal to 1 for the utility function parameter α [gamble 
gain: 1.02 (0.06); gamble loss: 1.03 (0.13); insurance gain: 1.00 (0.03)]. By contrast, 
for insurance losses mean values (SD) for β, δ and α were 0.69 (0.23), 1.60 (0.64) and 
1.00 (0.02) respectively and the model reproduced the relationship between actual 
and weighted probabilities shown in Figure 1d. 
A two-way ANOVA showed no significant effect of task (insurance, gamble), type 
of the decision domain (loss, gain) and their interaction on error, or the utility 
function parameter α, or probability discriminability (β). However, there were 
significant effects of task, F (1, 56) = 16.34, large effect size ε = .14, p < .001, 
domain, F (1, 56) = 28.56, very large effect size ε = .25, p < .001, and an interaction 
effect, F (1, 56) = 8.11, medium effect size ε = .07, p < .01, on attractiveness (δ). 
Multiple-comparison tests with Bonferroni correction demonstrated that in the 
domain of loss the effect of task on attractiveness (δ) was significant, t (28) = 3.94, 
large effect size r = .60, p < .001, but in the domain of gain the effect of task was not 
significant, t (28) = 1.24, p > .05. Furthermore, planned comparison tests with 
Bonferroni correction showed that attractiveness (δ) for the insurance loss condition 
was significantly different from that for each of the other three conditions, all t (56) = 
7.06, large effect size r = .59, p <.001. The finding of a greater value for 
attractiveness in the insurance loss condition indicates that respondents overweighted 
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small and medium probabilities to a greater extent in that condition and is consistent 
with the notion that respondents show a protective effect for precautionary decisions.  
Our results demonstrate that the independent variables task and domain did not 
affect the error of the model in predicting CE, or the utility function parameter α, or 
probability discriminability (β). Best fitting utility functions were approximately 
linear in each condition, with α ≈ 1. Thus the observed differences across conditions 
in the probability-weighting function are not compensated by any corresponding 
changes in the utility function across conditions.  
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated a different pattern of over- and 
underweighting of probabilities in the insurance-loss condition compared to the other 
conditions. A protective effect - exaggerated probability weights for insurance-loss 
decisions was observed. Existing normative and descriptive theories cannot account 
for the phenomenon found in Experiment 1, which can be modeled as a function of 
two psychologically autonomous properties of the probability-weighting function (cf. 
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999): β (the curvature) signifying probability discriminability and 
δ - attractiveness (the elevation). This finding suggests a need for models which 
differentiate between precautionary behavior and other types of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty.  
Cumulative prospect theory predicts a fourfold pattern of risk preferences (see 
Table 4) across gain and loss scenarios: people are predominantly risk seeking for 
low probability gains and high probability losses and predominantly risk averse for 
high probability gains and low probability losses. However, protective decision-
making with described real-world prospects, as represented in Figure 1d, highly 
overweights small, moderate and even large probabilities and underweights only the 
most extreme high-probability options, in contrast to the function we (and Tversky 
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and Kahneman) observed for gambles and that is responsible for the fourfold pattern 
of risk preferences. All of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) participants (25), were 
predominantly risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses (see Table 4); we 
replicated this observation in respondents contemplating monetary gambles (see 
Tables 1 and 2). In contrast our insurance respondents, although predominantly risk 
averse for gains (see Table 1), were also predominantly risk averse for losses (see 
Table 2). 
As we noted earlier, prominent decision theories - although differing in their 
approach - assume that all decisions can be represented as gambles with monetary 
amounts representing the outcomes. The present findings suggests that, counter to this 
assumption, decision-making with risky prospects is influenced by the nature of the 
issue being decided and is not independent of the decision-task. 
Experiment 2 
The protective effect (exaggerated probability weights) found in Experiment 1, if 
confirmed, creates difficulties for current descriptive theories of decision-
making. This is why it is important to demonstrate the stability of the risk preferences 
found in Experiment 1. Accordingly, in Experiment 2 we sought to replicate the 
effect with the same participants, but leaving time to allow their memory of the 
specific trials of the experiment to decay (in Experiment 3 we again sought to 
replicate the effect using a different sample of respondents).  
In Experiment 2 the stability over time of the protective effect (exaggerated 
probability weights) found in Experiment 1 was assessed. This experiment further 
explored people’s precautionary preferences and the significance of the probability 
function’s overweighting for protective loss, following Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) and Tversky and Fox’s (1995) theoretical framework. 
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Method 
Ninety days after Experiment 1, the same 15 participants who were in the 
insurance loss condition in Experiment 1 took part again in the same experimental 
condition for a payment of £5. Materials and apparatus were the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion. 
We fitted the two parameter-probability weighting function for each participant as 
in the previous experiment. Mean values (SD) were 0.67 (0.23) for probability 
discriminability (β), 1.43 (0.77) for attractiveness (δ) and 1.00 (0.03) for the utility 
function parameter α. The model produced the relationship between actual and 
weighted probabilities shown in Figure 1e; as can be seen, the shape of the function is 
very similar to that observed for insurance losses in Experiment 1 (cf. Figure 1d). In 
terms of the two-parameter model, decision-making was consistent within 
participants from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, with intra-class correlations1 (ICC) 
of .71 for β, F (14, 14) = 3.56, p = .001, and .87 for δ, F (14, 14) = 14.31, p < .001. 
The pattern of risk-seeking preferences (proportions of total (SD) = .00 (.00), .11 
(0.21) and .46 (0.29), for p = .01, .01 < p ≤ .1 and p ≥ .5 respectively) was very 
similar to that in the insurance loss condition in Experiment 1 (see Figure 2). This 
pattern was identical for the probability of .01 and consistent for probabilities .01 < p 
≤ .10, ICC = .47, F (14, 14) = 2.77, p < .05, and for probabilities ≥ .50, ICC = .91, F 
(14, 14) = 20.26, p < .001. In conclusion, the stability of the protective effect 
identified in Experiment 1 was confirmed in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3 
The protective effect found in Experiment 1 proved to be stable over time 
(Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the generalizability of this effect under 
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different circumstances: (a) a different type of protective (insurance) scenario (home 
insurance), (b) a different monetary amount for the sure outcome and accordingly (c) 
a different set of monetary amounts for the probabilistic outcome were used, 
furthermore (d) participants took part in only one session. 
Method 
Participants. 
One hundred and twenty-eight students (99 female, 29 male) from the University 
of Teesside participated individually as part of their course requirement, their mean 
age was 22 (SD = 6.49). 
Stimuli and Equipment. 
An interactive computer program for binary decision-making was employed. Four 
types of binary decision-making situation (scenario), each corresponding with one of 
four experimental conditions, were included: gamble gain (monetary gamble with a 
sure gain versus a gain with a given probability) (n = 33), gamble loss (monetary 
gamble with a sure loss versus a loss with a given probability) (n = 34), insurance 
gain (a sure rebate on an insurance premium versus a rebate with a given probability) 
(n = 30) and insurance loss (insurance against burglary versus loss of belongings as a 
result of burglary with a given probability) (n = 31). 
Participants were required to indicate a preference between a probabilistic outcome 
and a sure outcome in a series of 231 trials. Using a method similar to that used by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the trials were created by combining 1 monetary 
amount for the probabilistic outcome (£600) with each of 11 probabilities (.01, .05, 
.10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99), and each of these combinations was 
presented with one of 21 monetary amounts representing the sure outcomes (linearly 
spaced between £1 and £600), producing 1×11×21 = 231. The 231 decisions were 
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presented in random order. The CE of a prospect was estimated as the midpoint 
between the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value. 
Design and Procedure. 
A 2×2 between-subjects design was used, with independent variables task (gamble, 
insurance) and domain (gain, loss). At the start of the session, task instructions and 
then an example scenario with illustrative choices were presented. On each trial, 
participants were asked to consider a presented scenario and choose one of two 
options, for example: 
Insurance Loss Scenario: 
A. A 10% chance of losing your belongings which are worth £600 
or 
B. Buying insurance at a cost of £90 to insure against the loss of your belongings. 
Participants completed a series of 231 trials of binary decisions with one of the 
four types of scenario. 
Results and Discussion 
Risk Preference 
In both loss scenarios, rates of risk-seeking choices increased as the probability of 
the risky prospect increased (see Table 5 and Figure 5), but with more risk seeking in 
the gamble-loss scenario - ranging from 35% to 92% - than in the insurance-loss 
scenario - ranging from 10% to 46%, confirming the pattern of risk preferences found 
in Experiments 1 and 2. A two-way ANOVA investigating the effects of domain 
(gain, loss) and probability of risky prospect on risk preferences confirmed this result 
for the loss scenarios, with significant effects of probability (= .01, ≤ .1 and ≥ .5), F 
(2, 126) = 39.30, p < .001, large effect size (ε2 = .20), and task (gamble, insurance), F 
(1, 63) = 39.96, p <.001, large effect size (ε2 = .17), but the interaction effect of 
EXAGGERATED RISK 20 
 
probability and task was not significant, F (2, 126) = 1.80, p > .05. In the gain 
scenarios risk seeking decreased with probability, and gamble and insurance 
scenarios did not seem to differ (see Figure 5).  A further two-way ANOVA 
investigating the effects of domain (gain, loss) and probability of risky prospect on 
risk preferences for the gain scenarios showed a significant effect of probability (= 
.01, ≤ .1 and ≥ .5), F (2, 122) = 189.66, p < .001, very large effect size (ε2 = .58), but 
the effect of task (gamble, insurance) F (1, 61) = 2.01, p = .16 and the interaction 
effect of probability and task, F < 1, were not significant. 
Certainty Equivalent 
The average CE estimation was based on 21 sure outcomes, each presented 
together with 11 probabilistic outcomes. As in Experiment 1, the average CE was 
higher for the insurance loss scenario (above 0.5) than for the other scenarios (below 
0.4) (See Figure 6). A 2×2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with independent variables 
task (insurance, gamble) and domain (loss, gain) showed that the main effects of 
domain, F (1, 124) = 68.28, very large effect size ε2 = .29, p < .001, and of task, F (1, 
124) = 26.95, large effect size ε2 = .11, p < .001, as well as the interaction effect, F (1, 
124) = 15.76, medium effect size ε2 = .06, p < .001, were significant (see also Figure 
6). Simple effect tests with Bonferroni correction showed that the effect of domain 
was significant both in the gamble task, t (65) = 3.07, medium effect size r = .36, p < 
.01, and in the insurance task t (59) = 8.59, very large effect size r = .75, p < .001. 
The difference between the effect sizes was significant as well, z = 3.26, p < .001. 
Further simple effect tests with Bonferroni correction showed that the effect of task 
was significant in the domain of losses, t (63) = 6.77, large effect size r = .65, p < 
.001, but not in the domain of gains, t < 1, r = .11. The difference between the effect 
sizes was significant, z = 3.69, p < .001. These results demonstrate higher CE 
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judgments for the prospects within the insurance loss condition, in agreement with the 
results of risk preferences found in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Probability-Weighting Function 
Judged probabilities in the insurance loss scenario were modeled as in Experiment 
1. The results from Experiment 3 confirmed our basic finding that with precautionary 
decisions people exaggerate risk. There were differences in the shape of the 
probability-weighting function in the different tasks (gambles and precautionary 
decisions); specifically probability weights were exaggerated in precautionary 
decisions in the domain of loss (Figure 4).  
We fitted the function for all participants (see Figures 4a, 4b, 4c), minimizing the 
summed squared error between actual CEs and predicted CEs of all participants, and 
values of model parameters were < 1 for probability discriminability (β) (gamble 
gain: 0.48; gamble loss: 0.67; insurance gain: 0.56), < 1 for attractiveness (δ) (gamble 
gain: 0.37; gamble loss: 0.98; insurance gain: 0.45)  and (almost) equal to 1 for the 
utility function parameter α (gamble gain: 0.98; gamble loss: 0.95; insurance gain: 
0.98). In the insurance-loss scenario, small, medium-sized and moderately large 
probabilities were overweighted and large probabilities were slightly underweighted 
and values for β, δ and α were 0.55, 1.86 and 0.99 respectively. 
One possible reason for the difference between gambles and precautionary 
decisions in the domain of loss is that, for precautionary decisions, experienced real-
world risk frequencies are likely to influence decision-making about described 
recognizable prospects.  We hypothesize that the probability-weighting function is 
affected by the accessibility of real-world events - instances of some described real-
world precautionary prospects may be more accessible in our memory than any (less 
likely) corresponding traces that may exist for monetary gambles.   
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As in previous research, participants in the gamble-gain and insurance-gain 
conditions, overweighted very small probabilities and underweighted medium-sized 
and large probabilities (see Figures 4a, 4c). Similarly in the gamble-loss condition 
small to medium-sized probabilities were overweighted and the remaining 
probabilities underweighted. However, in the insurance-loss condition, small to 
medium-sized probabilities were massively overweighted, medium-sized to high 
probabilities somewhat overweighted and only very high probabilities underweighted 
(see Figures 4b and 4d). The results of Experiment 3, confirmed the distinctiveness of 
people’s precautionary decisions, in particular a different pattern of over- and 
underweighting of probabilities compared to the gamble condition. Participants 
exaggerated (overweighted) the described protective risk and demonstrated a lack of 
risk-seeking preferences in protective decision-making compared to the monetary 
(gamble) condition, where risk-seeking preferences predominated (see Table 5). 
Experiment 4 
As discussed earlier, prior research has reported increased attractiveness of risk-
averse options when presented in the context of insurance decisions (Hershey & 
Schoemaker, 1980; Schoemaker & Kunreuther, 1979; Slovic et al., 1977). When 
evaluating risks for insurance people do not usually use statistical evidence about the 
probability of risky events. Instead people may commonly rely on inferences based 
on what they remember hearing or observing about a particular risk (Hertwig, Pachur 
& Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). According to the accessibility framework (Kahneman, 2003; 
Koriat, 1993, 1995; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966), people’s judgments are based on 
the amount and intensity of the information accessed in the course of a particular task. 
Many instances of insurable events are encountered in everyday life more frequently 
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than others not only from personal experience but also via TV, newspapers, 
advertisements and conversations. Reliance on such sources may have some validity 
(cf. Hertwig, Pachur & Kurzenhäuser, 2005) but may induce erroneous feelings that 
some sorts of risk are more frequent than others (e.g., Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Layman & Combs, 1978). For instance, the familiarity bias reported by Fox and 
Levav (2000) showed that people typically judged more familiar events to be more 
probable than less familiar events, more often than they judged the complement of the 
same less familiar event to be more probable than the complement of the more 
familiar events. Thus when MBA students were asked to judge the comparative future 
performance of two investment funds, the proportion who judged that a familiar fund 
was more likely than an unfamiliar fund to perform well was greater than the 
proportion who judged that the unfamiliar fund was more likely than the familiar fund 
to perform poorly. Such results are assumed to occur partly because it is easier to 
recruit evidence supporting familiar events than unfamiliar events. Accordingly we 
hypothesized that more accessible events (e.g., high-frequency events) would be 
viewed with an increased perceived likelihood, whereas less accessible events (e.g., 
low-frequency events and monetary gambles) would not be. 
In their studies, Koriat (1995) and Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) rated the 
accessibility of questions as high or low on the basis of the percentage of participants 
who provided an answer to each question regardless of whether the answers were 
correct or incorrect. We adapted this method for the present study where participants 
were first asked to recall any instances of the defined events and then rate their 
frequency (high- or low-frequency risks). We defined the accessibility of events in 
memory in terms of these subjective ratings of their frequency (high- or low-
frequency risks). We then investigated whether the influence of accessibility would 
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be strong enough to have a measurable impact on the risky decisions that respondents 
made in the decision-making phase of the experiment. Accordingly, Experiment 4 
examined the hypothesis that accessibility (measured by rated frequency) affects 
choice and risk preferences for risky decisions where we explicitly supplied - and 
independently varied - the precise probability of the risk. In particular, we predicted 
greater risk-averse behavior for more accessible risks. We also hypothesized that the 
certainty equivalents inferable from people’s insurance decisions would reflect an 
apparent exaggeration of the supplied probability for judged high-frequency risks 
compared to low-frequency risks. Given our argument that monetary gambles provide 
few accessible features, risk aversion for monetary gambles should be less than, or, at 
most, at the same level as for the judged low-frequency risks. 
In order to meet a possible criticism of the earlier experiments that they involved 
respondents repeatedly evaluating the same risky scenario (albeit with varying 
probabilities and amounts of loss), Experiment 4 presents a wide range of different 
risky scenarios to each respondent. All decisions required respondents to consider the 
risk of loss.  
Method 
Development of Materials. 
A norming procedure was designed to produce two sets of risk and to allow the 
selection of high- and low-frequency risks to be used in Experiment 4. Eighty-four 
City University undergraduate and postgraduate students (52 female, 32 male) were 
recruited for a brief norming procedure. The participants were paid £3 and took part 
individually. Mean age was 19.17 (SD =2.26). On the basis of our intuitive 
judgments, 24 risks with similar actuarial low probability were presented - 12 
presumed to be perceived as low- and 12 presumed to be perceived as high-frequency 
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risks were included. Respondents rated each risk according to its frequency 
(participants were asked to refer to any instances of each risk that came to mind from 
any source of information) on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not frequent to 
very frequent. In order to help respondents to focus on frequency independent of 
riskiness, respondents also rated the riskiness of these risks on a 10-point Likert scale 
from not risky to very risky. Participants were encouraged to use the full range of the 
scale (see Appendix). 
At the start of the procedure, task instructions and then all 24 risks were presented 
before any of the ratings were elicited. Participants first had to judge the frequency of 
each of the presented risks and then - in a separate series - their riskiness. 
Our intuitions were broadly confirmed; those items we selected as high frequency 
were rated significantly higher than those selected to represent low frequency. As 
expected, the estimated frequency of the average risks rated as high frequency (mean 
= 6.09, CI
.95(mean) = [5.83; 6.35], SD = 1.19) was higher than that of the average 
risks rated as low frequency (mean = 4.27, CI
.95(mean) = [4.03; 4.50], SD = 1.08), 
t (83) = 14.16, p <.001, r = .84, with high-frequency risks estimated 43% higher than 
low-frequency risks. The estimated frequency of risks correlated with the perceived 
riskiness of risks, r = .64, p <. 001. The nine risks with the highest estimated 
frequency and the nine risks with the lowest estimated frequency were selected for 
inclusion in Experiment 4 (see Appendix). Across respondents, the mean judged 
frequency of the high-frequency risks was always greater than 5, whereas the mean 
judged frequency of the low-frequency risks was always less than 5. 
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Participants. 
Ninety City University undergraduate and postgraduate students (36 male and 54 
female) were recruited for a decision-making experiment. They were paid £5 and 
took part individually. Mean age was 19.17 (SD = 2.26). 
Stimuli and Equipment. 
As before, a computer-based experiment for binary decision-making was 
employed. On the basis of the results from the norming procedure, we constructed 
three types of binary decision-making situation (scenario), each corresponding with 
one of three experimental conditions: high-frequency risk (insurance against risks 
with a given probability that received a high estimated frequency in the norming 
procedure), low-frequency risk (insurance against risks with a given probability that 
received a low estimated frequency) and monetary-gamble risk (monetary gamble 
with a sure loss versus a loss with a given probability). Thirty participants were 
assigned to each experimental condition. 
Participants in each condition were required to choose between a probabilistic 
outcome and a sure outcome in a series of 162 trials: on each trial the fixed monetary 
amount for the probabilistic outcome (£680) was paired with one of 9 probabilities 
(.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, .95, .99) with one of the risks (judged as either high or 
low frequency in the norming procedure) or a monetary gamble and each of these 
combinations was presented with one of 18 amounts for the sure outcomes (linearly 
spaced between £1 and £680), producing 1×9×18 = 162 trials. The probability levels 
were presented in random order. As before, the CE of a prospect was estimated as the 
midpoint between the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value. 
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Design and Procedure. 
A 3 task (monetary-gamble risk, high-frequency insurance risk, low-frequency 
insurance risk) × 9 probability levels (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, .95, .99) design 
was used. Task was a between-groups factor and probability was a within-groups 
factor. All nine probabilities were used in each of the three task conditions. However, 
in order to maximize any effect of accessibility on risk aversion, in the high-
frequency insurance risk condition we attached the highest-probability levels to those 
risks judged as more frequent in the norming procedure and, for the low-frequency 
insurance risk condition, we attached the highest-probability levels to those risks 
judged as less frequent in the norming procedure (see Appendix). 
At the start of the computer-controlled experimental session, task instructions and 
then an example scenario with illustrative choices were presented. On each trial, 
participants were asked to consider a presented scenario and choose one of two 
prospects, for example: 
A. A 10% chance of theft of your laptop computer worth £680 
or 
B. Buying insurance at a cost of £40 to insure against the theft of your laptop 
computer. 
Participants completed a series of 162 trials each consisting of binary decisions 
with one of the three types of scenario. 
Results and Discussion 
Risk Preference 
A plausible account for the difference between monetary gambles and 
precautionary decisions observed in our earlier experiments is that precautionary 
decisions invite respondents to refer to their experience and knowledge of the events 
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referred to while gambles do not. The results from Experiment 4 are consistent with 
this interpretation and moreover confirm our hypothesis regarding the differential 
accessibility of familiar and unfamiliar (judged high- and judged low-frequency) risks 
- risk aversion is greatest for the high-frequency decisions (59% overall), smaller for 
the low-frequency decisions (40% overall) and least for the monetary gambles (32% 
overall; see Table 6).  
As in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, participants’ choices in the monetary-gamble risk 
and low-frequency risk conditions revealed a preponderance of risk-averse behavior 
for prospects with small probabilities (see Table 6) and risk-seeking preferences for 
prospects with medium and large probabilities. Decisions in the high-frequency 
condition were more risk averse for small and medium probabilities and, unlike the 
low frequency and monetary gamble conditions, were even predominantly risk averse 
for probabilities as high as 50% (see Table 6). In all three conditions, rates of risk-
seeking choices increased with probability of risky prospects, but with even more risk 
seeking in the monetary-gamble and low-frequency risks scenarios than in the high-
frequency risks scenarios, confirming the pattern of risk preferences found in 
Experiments 1 and 3. A 3 (high-frequency risk; low-frequency risk; monetary 
gamble) × 9 (probability level) ANOVA confirmed these results: the main effects of 
risk scenario, F (8, 696) = 44.40, p < .001, ε = .27, and probability level, 
F (2, 87) = 20.62, p < .001, ε = .06, were significant. The interaction effect was not 
significant, F < 1. Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni correction confirmed 
that risk-seeking preferences were significantly lower for high-frequency risks than 
for low-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks (both p < .001), but there was no 
significant difference between low-frequency- and monetary gamble risks (p > .05). 
Certainty Equivalent 
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As in Experiment 3 we analyzed the average level of participants’ CE in order to 
investigate the need for theory to differentiate protective decision-making from other 
types of decision-making. For each respondent the average CE estimation was based 
on 18 sure outcomes, each presented together with 9 probabilistic outcomes. 
Consistent with the results for risk-preferences, risk scenario had an effect on CE; 
participants’ CE for high-frequency risks were higher (overall 0.46) than these for 
low-frequency risks (overall 0.39) and monetary gambles (overall 0.40), indicating a 
greater propensity for precautionary decisions for high-frequency risks. 
Unsurprisingly, CE increased with probability for all three types of risk (see Table 7). 
A 3 (high-frequency risk; low-frequency risk; monetary gamble) × 9 (probability 
level) ANOVA confirmed the significant main effects of risk scenario, 
F (8, 696) = 267.00, p < .001, ε = .68, and probability level, F (2, 87) = 4.64, p < .05, 
ε = .01, but the interaction effect was not significant (F < 1). Multiple comparison 
tests with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that CE was significantly higher for high-
frequency risks than for low-frequency risks (p < .05) and the difference between 
high-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks was close to significance 
(.05 < .p < .10), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency- and 
monetary gamble risks (p > .05). 
Although there is no scope for any generic theory of risky choice to anticipate any 
difference between the responses given to low- and high-frequency risks where the 
supplied probabilities are matched, we do observe a difference: high-risk events 
evoke choices with higher CE than low-risk events. The most plausible basis for this 
discrepancy is the encoded frequency of these events in respondents’ memory.  
Inspection of Table 7 also indicates that the difference between the certainty 
equivalents for the low- and high-frequency risks increases as the probability of the 
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risky prospect increases. Recall that, in the choice task for the high-frequency 
insurance risk condition, we attached the highest-probability levels to those risks 
judged as more frequent in the norming procedure; however, for the low-frequency 
insurance risk condition, we attached the highest-probability levels to those risks 
judged as less frequent in the norming procedure. Accordingly, the increasing 
difference between the CEs for high- and low-frequency events can be attributed to 
the influence of the accessibility of memory representations for these events - also 
responsible for the increasing difference in the judged frequency of those events. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the correlation between the difference in judged 
frequency for high- and low-frequency events and the corresponding difference in CE 
is positive and significant (r = .88, p = .002).  
Probability-Weighting Function 
We attempted to obtain fits of the probability-weighting function for individual 
participants but, presumably due to noise in responses, were unable to obtain good 
fits. To reduce noise we attempted to fit the probability weighting function for triples 
of participants; respondent triples were formed based on the similarity of participants’ 
CEs. Ten triples were created for each of the three conditions. We fitted the functions 
for each triple and then analyzed the effect of the independent variables on the model 
parameters - in each case, minimizing the summed squared error between actual CEs 
and predicted CEs. As in the previous experiments, the model parameters are 
estimated based on actual CEs, probabilities and monetary amounts of the certain 
options. We fitted the probability-weighting function successfully for eight of the ten 
triples in each of the high- and low-frequency conditions (the other four triples 
showed an inconsistent pattern of CE across probability levels, i.e. CE was not a 
EXAGGERATED RISK 31 
 
strictly increasing monotonic function of probability level) and for all participants in 
the monetary gamble condition. 
For monetary gambles and low-frequency insurance risks the mean values (SD) of 
attractiveness (δ) were < 1: for monetary gambles δ=0.77 (0.39) and for low-
frequency insurance risk δ=0.71 (0.68).  By contrast, for the high-frequency insurance 
risks condition mean values (SD) for δ was 1.47 (0.70). The finding of a greater value 
for attractiveness in the high-frequency insurance condition indicates that respondents 
overweighted probabilities to a greater extent in that condition and is consistent with 
the notion that respondents show a protective effect for (i.e. exaggerate risk for) 
decisions about more accessible risks.  
ANOVA conformed that the effect of task on attractiveness (δ) was significant, F 
(2, 23) = 4.11, very large effect size ε = .23, p < .05. Planned comparison tests with 
Bonferroni corrections showed that attractiveness (δ) for the insurance loss condition 
with high-frequency risk was significantly larger than that for each of the other two 
conditions: t (23) = 2.46, large effect size r = .46, p <.05 for gamble loss, and t (23) = 
2.54, large effect size r = .47, p <.05 for insurance with low-frequency risk. The 
model therefore exhibits a similar relationship between actual and weighted 
probabilities - exaggerated risk - to that shown in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.  
Parameter values for the other variables (probability discriminability [β] and utility 
[α]) were more similar across tasks: for high-frequency risks β=0.80 (0.29), α=0.98 
(0.03); for low-frequency insurance risk β=0.59 (0.36), α=1.06 (0.16); and for 
monetary gambles β=0.67 (0.26), α=0.99 (0.03). As in the previous experiments, the 
independent variables task and domain did not affect the utility function parameter 
(α), or probability discriminability (β); ANOVA showed no significant effect of task, 
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on the utility function parameter α, F (2, 23) = 3.14, p > .05, or probability 
discriminability (β), F (2, 23) = 1.04, p > .05.    
Together, the results from Experiment 4 suggest that participants’ risky choices are 
influenced by the accessibility of events in memory even when these events are 
explicitly presented with probability information and the values of the possible 
outcomes. As with Experiments 1, 2 and 3, our results demonstrate the specificity of 
people’s precautionary decisions: contemplating different referents of the risky choice 
“p chance of x, otherwise y” leads to different preferences, which, given the observed 
pattern, we attribute to respondents’ familiarity with the particular events being 
considered.  
The similar CE and pattern of risk aversion for low-frequency risks and monetary 
gambles and their differentiation from the high-frequency risks corroborate our view 
that the differences observed between monetary gambles and insurance risks in the 
earlier experiments were caused by differences in the accessibility of these prospects. 
Experiment 5 
The memory-based account presented in this paper assumes that the frequency of 
encounters with risky events in everyday life affects participants’ preferences in 
characteristic ways not anticipated by most theories which assume that all risky 
choices are equivalent to monetary gambles. Our account implies that, when making 
risky decisions, human preferences are affected by decision content - specifically the 
accessibility of events in memory - even after outcome values and probabilities are 
known. We hypothesize that decisions about events rated as high-frequency differ 
from decisions about events rated as low-frequency and monetary gambles because 
the first cues accessible features in memory while the latter two do not.  
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Experiment 5 was designed to explore this issue further by investigating whether 
risky choices for the same events would vary systematically across respondents who 
had different perceptions of the frequency of those events. Studies have established 
that people in different countries have different views as to the riskiness of various 
events (e.g., Teigen, Brun & Slovic, 1988). We aimed to investigate if accessibility 
(measured by judged frequency) has a measurable impact on participants’ risky 
preferences when we compare the risky choices made by UK participants and 
participants recruited in Japan who we expect to differ somewhat in their perceived 
frequency of some of the risky events. In particular, we predict an association 
between differences in accessibility and resulting differences in the patterns of risky 
preferences across the two participant populations.  
Method 
Materials and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 4 though all stimuli and 
instructions were translated into Japanese. Based on the norming procedure in 
Experiment 4, respondents were asked to rate each risk according to its frequency 
(participants were asked to refer to any instances of each risk that came to mind from 
any source of information) on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not frequent to 
very frequent. Participants first judged the frequency of each of the presented risks 
and then they were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental risky choice 
conditions. For the risky choices, monetary amounts were in Japanese yen (¥) and 
equivalent in value to those used in Experiment 4.  
Participants 
Seventy-five University of Tokyo undergraduate and postgraduate students (49 
male and 26 female) were recruited for a decision-making experiment. They were 
paid ¥700 and took part individually. Mean age was 20.67 (SD = 3.11). 
EXAGGERATED RISK 34 
 
Results and Discussion 
As we expected, the Japanese respondents judged the frequency of the risky events 
somewhat differently to how the UK respondents (in Experiment 4) judged the same 
events - in some cases the differences were quite marked (see Appendix). As we 
predicted, across events, the differences between Japanese and UK (Experiment 4) 
respondents’ mean judged frequency for each of the risky events corresponds to 
differences in their willingness to buy insurance for those events as measured by the 
CE measures used previously (r = .62, p = .006). A noteworthy aspect of this finding 
is that, unlike Experiment 4 which compared reactions to different high and low-
frequency risks, it shows a difference in willingness to take risks for the same events 
as a function of differences in their perceived differential frequency. Consequently, 
the observed difference here cannot be attributed to any qualitative differences 
between the types of events.  
As with the UK respondents in Experiment 4, for Japanese respondents the 
correlation (across nine levels of probability) between the difference in judged 
frequency for high- and low-frequency events and the corresponding difference in CE 
is positive and significant (r = .78, p < .05). This result replicates the finding that the 
frequency of events affects risky choices and further supports our claim that the 
accessibility of memory representations of events affects risky choices for these 
events.  
Risk Preference 
For both low-frequency insurance risks and monetary gambles more risk-seeking 
preferences were evident than for high-frequency insurance risks across most of the 
range of probabilities (see Table 8). The judged frequency of the four risks rated as 
highly frequent (above the midpoint of the scale) by both UK and Japanese 
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participants in Experiments 4 and 5 (high-high risks) and their four counterparts rated 
as low frequency (below the midpoint of the scale) by both UK and Japanese 
participants (low-low risk) were analyzed for Japanese participants. A 3 (task: low-
frequency insurance task, high-frequency insurance task, and monetary gamble) × 4 
(probability level: .05, .25, .50, and .99) ANOVA showed that the main effects of 
task, F (2, 72) = 13.94, p < .001, ε = .07, and probability level, F (3, 216) = 58.01, 
p < .001, ε = .33, on risk preference were significant. The interaction effect was not 
significant, F (3, 216) = 1.06, p >.05. Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni 
corrections confirmed that risk-seeking preferences were significantly lower for high-
frequency risks than for low-frequency risks (p = .001) and monetary-gamble risks 
(p < .001), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency- and 
monetary gamble risks (p > .05). 
The effects of both judged risk frequency and supplied probability on risky 
preferences (0 = risk-seeking, 1 = risk-averse) in the insurance conditions were 
investigated over all presented risky events and all probability levels using 
hierarchical logistic regression analysis. Independent variables were judged event 
frequency (per participant) and supplied probability (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, 
.95, and .99), while controlling for the effect of participant (using criterion scaling, 
Pedhazur, 1997). The effects of judged frequency, χ2 (1) = 31.88, odds ratio = 3.58, 
p < .001, and probability, χ2 (1) = 23.11, odds ratio = 0.009, p < .001, and the 
interaction effect, χ2 (1) = 3.84, odds ratio = 0.58, p = .05, were all statistically 
significant. The effects of judged frequency and probability confirm that both factors 
affect risky choice. Inspection of the interaction showed that judged frequency had a 
greater influence on decisions with lower probabilities resulting in more risk aversion 
than for higher probabilities though this may be due to a ceiling effect; for high 
EXAGGERATED RISK 36 
 
probabilities participants were risk seeking close to 100% of the time. Further testing 
showed that the effect of judged frequency was significant for both probabilities 
below the median value (.50), χ2 (1) = 23.45, odds ratio = 3.12, p < .001, and for 
probabilities above the median value, χ2 (1) = 30.42, odds ratio = 2.15, p < .001.  
Certainty Equivalent 
The judged frequency of the four risks rated as highly frequent in both 
Experiments 4 and 5 (high-high risks) and their counterparts (low-low risks) were 
analyzed. Analysis of the high-frequency insurance risks showed a higher CE than 
monetary gambles and low-frequency risks across the range of probabilities (see 
Table 9). A 3 (task: low-frequency insurance risk, high-frequency insurance risk, and 
monetary gamble) × 4 (probability level: .05, .25, .50, and .99) ANOVA confirmed 
the main effects of task, F (2, 72) = 21.98, p < .001, ε = .03, and probability level, 
F (3, 216) = 493.30, p < .001, ε = .80, were significant. The interaction effect was 
not significant, F (3, 216) = 1.30, p > .05. Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni 
correction confirmed that CE was significantly higher for high-frequency risks than 
for low-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks (both p < .001), but there was no 
significant difference between low-frequency- and monetary gamble risks (p > .05). 
The effects of both judged risk frequency and supplied probability on CE was 
investigated over all presented risks in the insurance conditions and all probability 
levels using hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Independent variables were 
judged risk frequency and probability (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .09, .95, and .99), 
while controlling for the effect of participant (using criterion scaling - Pedhazur, 
1997). The effects of judged frequency, t (396) = 16.32, sr2 = .06, p < .001, and 
probability, t (396) = 60.63, sr2 = .86, p < .001, and the interaction effect (judged 
frequency by probability), t (396) = 3.34, sr2 < .01, p < .001, were significant. 
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Inspection of the interaction showed that, as with risk preferences, judged frequency 
had a greater influence on decisions with higher probabilities resulting in even higher 
CEs than for lower probabilities. Further testing showed that the effect of judged 
frequency was significant for both probabilities below the median value (.50), 
t (197) = 6.31, sr2 = .20, p < .001, and for probabilities above the median value, 
t (197) = 10.10, sr2 = .35, p < .001. 
The effect of judged frequency from the norming procedure on CE and pattern of 
risk aversion are consistent with our view that the differences observed between 
monetary gambles and insurance risks in the earlier experiments were caused by 
differences in the accessibility of these prospects.  
In summary, the results from Experiment 5 corroborate our earlier findings that 
decisions about subjectively more frequent events are different from those observed 
for equivalent choices between monetary gambles and judged low-frequency events. 
Japanese participants’ risky judgments and corresponding preferences were different 
from those observed in the UK sample, but nonetheless maintained the same 
relationship to each other and thereby confirmed our hypothesis regarding the impact 
of differential accessibility of risks on choice. 
General Discussion 
Our research demonstrates that risky decisions vary as a function of the events 
being considered even after all required probabilities and outcome values have been 
specified. In five experiments we found and confirmed a protective effect - 
exemplified by exaggerated probability weights and greater risk aversion for 
precautionary decisions about more accessible (high frequency) events compared to 
less accessible (low frequency) events and monetary gambles. These findings 
establish that, contrary to the assumptions of normative theory and numerous 
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descriptive theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty (e.g., Birnbaum, 
2008; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), people’s risk 
preferences and decisions under risk and uncertainty are not independent of problem 
content after all probabilities and outcome values are defined.  
From the point of view of those theorists who assume that all risky decisions can 
be represented as monetary gambles the results can be viewed as a demonstration of 
the failure of descriptive invariance - one of the axioms of expected utility theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). The descriptive invariance axiom states that 
equivalent formulations of a choice problem should give rise to the same preference 
order. However we found that varying referent events with the same decision-making 
prospects leads to different preference patterns.  
Our result implies that the assumption that all decisions under risk or uncertainty 
can be effectively represented by monetary gambles, requires some revision. 
Precautionary decisions can still, in a general sense, be viewed as gambles - but with 
the critical proviso that decision makers make different decisions when contemplating 
precautions than when contemplating gambles with identical values.  
The finding that people’s risk preferences cannot be accurately specified from 
studies of their reactions to monetary gambles raises both practical and theoretical 
questions. To the extent that there is no generally stable set of risk attitudes then 
reliable predictions of risky decision making will not be possible across different 
decision-making domains. The experiments reported here found discrepancies 
between the risk attitudes for gambles and those for decisions regarding insurance 
against hazards - perhaps the most obvious practical application of risky decision-
making.  
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We found that the probability-weighting function exhibits properties for 
precautionary decisions different to those observed for putatively identical choices 
between gambles. People’s protective willingness (greater risk aversion for 
precautionary decisions under risk) is indicated by increases in the probability-
weighting estimates for low, moderate and high probabilities of hazardous events. 
Overweighting of probability for precautionary decisions for moderate and high 
probabilities is a finding not anticipated by prospect theory or cumulative prospect 
theory - the most prominent descriptive theories for decisions under risk.  
Our findings of exaggerated risk for small probabilities are also not anticipated by 
proponents of so-called experience based decision making who have argued that 
people underweight rather than overweight small probabilities when making 
decisions based on their experience of risky events rather than summary descriptions 
of their likelihoods (Hertwig, Weber, Erev, & Barron, 2004). In particular, 
experienced-based decision-making research finds that people’s decisions about 
sequentially experienced events underweight low probability events (cf. Fox & 
Hadar, 2006; Jessup, Bishara & Busemeyer, 2008; Newell & Rakow, 2007; 
Ungemach, Chater & Stewart, 2009). Of course, our experiments were not 
specifically designed to investigate decisions based on experienced small probability 
events (we always supplied descriptions of likelihood of events). Nonetheless, when 
decisions involved real-world events that could relate to and draw on our participants’ 
experience, overweighting of probability (or risk aversion for negative events) was 
observed for small probabilities - even for those events participants rated as low 
frequency experiences (Experiments 4 & 5). 
The pattern of people’s risk preferences found here is inconsistent with those of 
previous descriptive studies. Early studies of utility commonly assumed that people’s 
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risk preferences are predominantly risk-averse (Pratt, 1964). However, risk seeking is 
also predictable under certain conditions. According to the well known fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes established with gambles (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; 
Tversky & Fox, 1995) people show risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses 
at high probability, and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses at low 
probability. A similar prediction is made by Brandstätter et al. (2006) with their 
proposed priority heuristic - which produces a pattern of risk-averse and risk-seeking 
preferences based on rules (priority, stopping and decision rules) consistent with the 
fourfold pattern found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) - see also Stewart et al. 
(2006).  
By contrast, we demonstrate that people’s risk preferences can be risk averse for 
precautionary decisions about high-frequency events for almost the whole range of 
probability, and yet with monetary gambles in the domain of loss and for 
precautionary decisions involving low-frequency events people are predominantly 
risk seeking. We find that, in precautionary decision-making, more accessible events 
in memory have a greater influence on decisions than less accessible events (e.g., 
monetary gambles and less familiar real-world events). Experiments 4 and 5 produced 
evidence that the accessibility of hazardous events affect people’s decisions: instances 
of some protectable risks are judged to occur more frequently in everyday life than 
others and the former risks produced a greater protective effect. The results of all five 
experiments demonstrated that people exaggerate described real-world risky 
prospects consistent with the assumption that precautionary decisions are dependent 
on the accessibility of hazardous events in memory. 
The idea presented in this paper that people’s precautionary decisions might be 
affected by the accessibility of frequencies in memory is also supported by case-based 
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decision theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2001), which assumes that decisions under 
uncertainty are made by analogy to previously-encountered problems. The theory 
postulates a similarity function over decision problems and a utility function on 
outcomes, such that acts are evaluated by a similarity-weighted sum of the utility they 
yielded in past cases in which they were chosen. 
The finding of Experiment 5 that Japanese decision makers, who differed from UK 
participants in their perception of the relative frequency of risky events and altered 
their choices accordingly, strongly suggests that a memory-based assessment of 
events informs risky decisions. The strong positive correlation between the 
differences in rated frequencies and the differences in risky choices for the same set 
of events is a clear indication that memorial representations of the frequency of 
events affected decisions made about them.   
Such ideas could possibly account for our findings that people’s risk preferences 
vary across specific decision-task domains, which, as we have argued, can be linked 
to the differential accessibility of the events under consideration. In contemplating 
most real-world risks, people suffer from a lack of knowledge about the probabilities 
of hazardous events (e.g., natural disaster, health and safety risk). Where accessibility 
is a valid cue for likelihood then it should produce reasonably good decisions. 
However, problems will arise when people have information about likelihood that is 
corrupted via the accessibility of events “altering” the impact of the probability 
information. One could view this as akin to the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) where 
information in memory that conflicts with information present in the stimulus can 
disrupt decisions. 
Other research has also shown differences in risky decisions as a function of 
decision content. Heath and Tversky (1991) found that decision makers under risk 
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were sensitive to aspects of content independent of probability and utility 
information. In their studies respondents exhibited a preference for betting on 
decisions about events on which they were knowledgeable rather than matched 
monetary gambles or events on which they were less knowledgeable. Although Heath 
and Tversky interpret their result in terms of attributions for credit and blame, it could 
also be interpreted in terms of accessibility. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) also found 
evidence for effects of decision content on risky choice. They report that the 
probability-weighting function may be influenced by affective reactions associated 
with potential outcomes of a risky prospect. As these authors point out, if the weight 
attached to an outcome depends on the nature of that outcome then it is not possible 
to specify separate functions to describe the evaluation of outcomes and the 
evaluation of probabilities. 
Huber and Huber (2008) have argued that gambles are not good models for many 
real life risky decisions because in real life, if decision makers realize that an 
otherwise attractive alternative may produce a negative outcome, they search for a 
risk-defusing operator (RDO) to eliminate or reduce the risk involved. In everyday 
risky decision situations, they claim that RDOs are quite common. For example, 
people having to decide whether or not to travel to a region where infectious disease 
are prevalent, will inquire whether there is a vaccine against that disease instead of 
passively contemplating probabilities. A person wanting to buy a new car but 
uncertain whether she can meet the monthly instalments, may take out consumer 
credit repayment insurance. Huber (2007) claims that in many real life decisions - but 
not monetary gambles - many decision makers are not interested in probability 
information and instead actively search for RDOs. Evidence for the search for RDOs 
has been found in insurance decision making (Williamson, Ranyard & Cuthbert, 
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2000). However it is not clear how RDOs could explain our finding that people are 
more risk averse for insurance than for gambles. According to Huber (2008) if a 
decision maker finds an RDO or an RDO is available, he or she chooses the risky 
alternative in question much more often than without finding an RDO. While RDOs 
might be discovered in insurance scenarios, in choices among gambles (according to 
Huber) besides choosing one alternative, the decision maker cannot exert any control 
at all. Moreover, it is clear that our respondents are influenced by probabilities. 
One possible objection to the claims made here is that the risky insurance loss is in 
fact objectively worse than the risky monetary loss, because the insurance loss 
involves an additional hassle factor (e.g., being deprived of possession's one likes, 
needing to go out and buy replacements). To the extent that the risky insurance losses 
are indeed more negative than the corresponding risky monetary losses, one might 
argue that it is not surprising that participants are more risk averse in the insurance 
domain. 
In our view, for both conceptual and empirical reasons, the notion that the 
insurance loss is objectively worse than the risky monetary loss cannot account for 
our results. For respondents in the insurance scenario any envisaged “additional 
hassle factor” should not influence the insurance decision. Whether one is insured or 
not, loss of the luggage implies that one has to suffer being deprived of possessions 
one likes and the inconvenience of having to go out and buy replacements - if one has 
the money to be able to afford to go and buy replacements, as, assuredly (literally), in 
the insurance case one does. The point is that, in the insurance scenario, the option to 
buy insurance does not magic away any hassle or even reduce the likelihood of 
experiencing hassle (cf. Tykocinski, 2008) and hence does not justify greater risk 
aversion; indeed, one might even argue that there might be greater hassle in the 
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insurance case if one buys insurance as here one has the additional hassle of making 
an insurance claim. 
In any event the idea that the insurance loss is objectively worse than the risky 
monetary loss was not a view held by our respondents as they were not, in terms of 
their willingness to suffer monetary losses to compensate them for loss of their 
luggage, risk averse for every level of probability of loss. As is shown in every 
experiment (e.g., see Figure 1d) respondents in the insurance loss condition were risk 
seeking at the highest level of probability of loss; had they valued loss of their 
luggage as worse than the loss of its corresponding expressed monetary value this 
would not have happened. 
Moreover, the possibility that risky insurance loss is objectively worse than the 
risky monetary loss is also excluded by another aspect of the results of Experiments 4 
and 5. In both of these experiments we report that, while risk-seeking preferences 
were significantly lower for high-frequency insurance risks than for low-frequency 
insurance risks and monetary gamble risks, there was no significant difference 
between low-frequency-insurance risks and monetary gamble risks; decisions were 
predominantly risk seeking for both sorts of risk - as predicted by cumulative 
prospect theory. Nevertheless the low-frequency insurance risks would still entail 
“hassles” of the sort envisaged by this argument and yet this does not appear to have 
been a factor for our respondents when considering such risks as “Damage to 
accommodation by burst pipes”, “Damage to laptop computers by fire (caused by a 
technical problem)” or “Damage to gardens by falling trees”. Although these hazards 
will undoubtedly involve “hassle” for a victim of these misfortunes, as we have 
explained, the hassle will present regardless of one’s decision to insure. 
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The effects we attribute to the accessibility of risky events should be tested further 
in future studies. For instance, one obvious next step is to see whether the effects can 
be measured when the accessibility of probability information is manipulated 
independently of subjective frequency beliefs. One possible way to achieve this, 
suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer of this paper, would be to develop a 
priming paradigm.  
In sum, the evidence presented in this paper calls into question the assumption that 
decisions made with monetary gambles can be used as a methodology for evaluating 
domain-independent risk preferences. We suggest that this in turn should prompt 
further exploration of how what it is that people are deciding about produces variation 
in the risks people are prepared to take.  
Over the years several authors have commented on the preeminence of monetary 
gambles in studies of risky choice.  For example, Lopes (1983) commented that: “The 
simple static lottery or gamble is as indispensable to research on risk as is the fruitfly 
to genetics” (p.173). Goldstein and Weber (1997) in similar comparative vein argued 
that: “Simple gambles are as prevalent in decision research as nonsense syllables ever 
were in memory research” (p. 92). 
It is understandable why researchers have found monetary gambles an attractive 
research vehicle. As Goldstein and Weber (1997) made clear it seems “…a poor trade 
to exchange familiar content free taxonomies of decision problems (e.g. decision 
making under risk, uncertainty and certainty) for an explosion of content-specific 
categories of decisions (e.g. career decisions; housing decisions; animal, mineral and 
vegetable decisions etc.), each of which may require a different theory” (p. 84). As 
these authors argue one can also be tempted to believe that in studying reactions to 
monetary gambles one is studying risky decision-making in its most “essential” form 
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permitting the widest possible generalizability. Although some take it as a basic 
premise that “Most decisions in life are gambles” (Fox & See, 2003, p. 273) our 
research indicates that for some decisions this attractive metaphor may be misleading. 
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Appendix 
 Judged frequency 
of eventa(UK) 
Judged riskiness 
of eventa(UK) 
Judged frequency 
of eventa (Japan) 
Probability presented 
with eventabb` 
Events Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Percentage 
Accidents using public transport (High)c 6.70 2.39 5.89 2.37 6.04 2.06 99 
Credit-card fraud (identity fraud) (High) 6.42 2.22 7.05 2.26 2.79 1.51 95 
Theft of laptop computers (High) 6.30 2.10 5.52 2.38 2.39 1.23 90 
Home burglaries (High) 6.17 2.34 6.74 2.07 2.52 1.39 75 
Loss of income as a result of 
redundancy (High) 6.08 
 
2.61 
 
6.42 
 
2.09 5.00 1.52 
 
50 
Loss of luggage and personal 
belongings (High) 5.94 
 
2.46 
 
5.27 
 
2.21 5.71 2.44 
 
25 
Accidents during football games (High) 5.85 2.40 5.65 2.26 4.11 1.70 10 
Accidents using home appliances 
(Low)d  5.76 
 
2.58 
 
5.90 
 
2.19 6.04 2.16 
 
5 
Theft of personal belongings inside cars 
(High) 5.67 
 
2.29 
 
5.61 
 
1.91 2.81 1.36 
 
1 
Accidents during leisure time (Low) 4.57 2.16 5.70 1.88 5.91 1.77 1 
Malicious damage to motorbikes  (Low) 4.54 2.33 4.44 2.15 3.12 1.56 5 
Damage to cars by storms (Low) 4.52 2.18 4.49 2.19 1.87 1.19 10 
Damage to accommodation by burst 
pipes (Low) 4.44 
 
2.32 
 
4.95 
 
2.30 3.24 1.61 
 
25 
Damage to laptop computers by fire 
(caused by a technical problem) (Low) 4.37 
 
2.28 
 
4.51 
 
2.32 3.67 1.80 
 
50 
Damage to gardens by flood (Low) 4.35 2.45 3.48 2.13 2.63 1.67 75 
Damage to gardens by falling trees 
(Low) 4.10 
 
2.33 
 
3.48 
 
1.90 2.57 1.32 
 
90 
Accidents during golf games (Low) 3.88 2.19 3.19 1.91 4.63 1.70 95 
Damage to property by aircraft or things 
falling from aircraft (Low) 3.63 
 
2.22 
 
3.99 
 
2.43 2.12 1.14 
 
99 
aNorming procedure bExperiment 4  b`Experiment 5 cRisk chosen as high-
accessibility stimulus for inclusion in the norming procedure(UK) dRisk chosen as 
low-accessibility for inclusion in the norming procedure (UK)  
EXAGGERATED RISK 54 
 
Author Note 
Petko Kusev, Paul van Schaik, Peter Ayton and Nick Chater are supported by 
Economic and Social Research Council Grant RES-000-22-1768. We are grateful to 
Neil Stewart for helpful comments and advice concerning the model presented in this 
paper. We thank the researchers working in Kazuo Shigemasu’s lab (University of 
Tokyo) and Kimihiko Yamagishi’s lab (Tokyo Institute of Technology) for their 
comments and help in organizing, translating the materials and recruiting for 
Experiment 5. 
We also thank the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Tokyo) and The 
British Academy SG 47881 for supporting Petko Kusev in his research in Japan 
(Experiment 5). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Petko 
Kusev, Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United 
Kingdom, e-mail: p.kusev@city.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXAGGERATED RISK 55 
 
Footnotes 
1
 The intra-class correlation co-efficient is a measure of similarity taking into 
account both profile shape and profile elevation (Lorr, 1983) and expresses the 
between-subjects variability relative to other sources of variability (Howell, 1997). 
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Table 1 
Percentage of risk preferences with gain (Experiment 1) 
 Gamble gain Insurance gain 
Risk preferences p =.01 .01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5   p =.01 .01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5 
Risk seeking 78% 59% 11% 77% 57% 9% 
Risk averse 22% 41% 89% 23% 43% 91% 
Note. Similarity between gain and insurance in risk seeking with gain. Percentages 
are mean values. 
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Table 2 
Percentage of risk preferences with loss (Experiment 1) 
 Gamble loss Insurance loss 
Risk preferences p =.01 .01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5   p =.01 01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5 
Risk seeking 10% 27% 83% 0% 7% 40% 
Risk averse 90% 73% 17% 100% 93% 60% 
Note. Inconsistency of risk seeking preferences with loss between gamble and 
insurance. Percentages are mean values. 
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Table 3 
Summary of analysis of variance results for certainty equivalent preferences 
(Experiment 1) 
Probabilistic amount Source F ε2 p 
£50 Task 8.13 0.08 0.024 
 Domain 8.31 0.09 0.022 
 
Task × domain 11.58 0.13 0.005 
£100 Task 7.22 0.06 0.038 
 Domain 29.77 0.27 0.000 
 
task × domain 13.30 0.12 0.002 
£200 Task 14.76 0.11 0.008 
 Domain 35.19 0.13 0.004 
 
Task × domain 27.82 0.09 0.020 
£400 Task 10.06 0.10 0.010 
 Domain 21.40 0.23 0.000 
 
Task × domain 2.21 0.01 0.571 
Notes. df = 1, 56 for all F ratios. Bonferroni correction applied to all p values. 
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Table 4 
Percentage of risk preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) 
         Gamble gain Gamble loss 
Risk preferences p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5   p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5 
Risk seeking 78% 10% 20% 87% 
Risk averse 10% 88% 80% 6% 
Note. Values that correspond to the fourfold pattern (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Percentages are mean values. 
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Table 5 
Percentage of risk preferences with loss (Experiment 3) 
 Gamble loss Insurance loss 
Risk preferences p =.01 .01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5   p =.01 .01 < p ≤ .1 p ≥ .5 
Risk seeking 35% 56% 92% 10% 17% 46% 
Risk averse 65% 44% 8% 90% 83% 54% 
Note. Inconsistency of risk seeking preferences with loss between gamble and 
insurance prospects. Percentages are mean values. 
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Table 6 
Mean proportion of risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences (Experiment 4) 
 High-frequency risk  Low-frequency risk  Monetary-gamble risk 
Probability  Risk seekinga Risk averseb Risk seekinga Risk averseb Risk seekinga Risk averseb 
p =.01 0% 100% 17% 83% 20% 80% 
p =.05 17% 83% 23% 77% 43% 57% 
p =.10 23% 77% 43% 57% 53% 47% 
p =.25 34% 76% 47% 53% 43% 57% 
p =.50 33% 67% 60% 40% 80% 20% 
p =.75 57% 43% 87% 13% 93% 7% 
p =.90 63% 37% 83% 17% 93% 7% 
p =.95 63% 37% 87% 13% 90% 10% 
p =.99 77% 23% 90% 10% 100% 0% 
Overall 41% 59% 60% 40% 68% 32% 
a[% of responses where CE > EV]  b[% of responses where CE < EV] 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of certainty equivalents (Experiment 4) 
Probability of risky prospect 
Task 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Average 
Monetary-gamble risk .043 (.06) .082 (.09) .132 (.09) .243 (.13) .382 (.16) .596 (.26) .637 (.16) .709 (.14) .812 (.07) .403 (.043) 
High-frequency risk .088 (.06) .121 (.16) .154 (.10) .303 (.23) .522 (.23) .637 (.25) .709 (.25) .757 (.16) .869 (.07) .462 (.088) 
Low-frequency risk .059 (.05) .096 (.73) .122 (.14) .251 (.22) .432 (.26) .549 (.34) .581 (.33) .651 (.31) .749 (.14) .388 (.059) 
Overall .063 (.06) .100 (.20) .137 (.12) .266 (.20) .446 (.22) .594 (.29) .641 (.26) .706 (.22) .810 (.10) .418 (.063) 
Note. Range is a proportion of £680. Values are means with (SD) 
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Table 8 
Mean proportion of risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences (Experiment 5) 
 High-frequency riska  Low-frequency riskb  Monetary-gamble risk 
Probability  Risk seekingc Risk aversed Risk seekingc Risk aversed Risk seekingc Risk aversed 
p =.01 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
p =.05 16% 84% 28% 72% 40% 60% 
p =.10 24% 76% 40% 60% 44% 56% 
p =.25 4% 96% 28% 72% 32% 68% 
p =.50 14% 86% 60% 40% 54% 44% 
p =.75 88% 12% 80% 20% 88% 12% 
p =.90 96% 4% 84% 16% 88% 12% 
p =.95 100% 0% 44% 56% 96% 4% 
p =.99 80% 20% 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Overall 47% 53% 52% 48% 60% 40% 
a,bStimuli identified as High and Low in Experiment 4 c[% of responses where CE > EV]  
d[% of responses where CE < EV] 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations of certainty equivalents (Experiment 5) 
Probability of risky prospect 
Task 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Average 
Monetary-gamble risk .042 (.04) .070 (.04) .141 (.10) .288 (.17) .449 (.19) .667 (.14) .747 (.18) .771 (.17) .845 (.11) .447 (.127) 
High-frequency riska .053 (.04) .184 (.14) .202 (.12) .386 (.12) .624 (.16) .599 (.19) .633 (.14) .734 (.10) .898 (.10) .479 (.126) 
Low-frequency riskb .092 (.09) .086 (.05) .137 (.07) .289 (.08) .486 (.12) .661 (.12) .769 (.11) .916 (.09) .786 (.11) .469 (.093) 
Overall .062 (.05) .113 (.08) .160 (.10) .321 (.12) .520 (.16) .642 (.15) .717 (.14) .807 (.12) .843 (.11) .465 (.115) 
Note. Range is a proportion of ¥136000. Values are means with (SD) a,bStimuli identified as High and Low in Experiment 4 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Two-parameter probability-weighting functions based on mean estimates of 
probability discriminability (β) and attractiveness (δ) in equation (1) (Experiments 1 
and 2). 
Figure 2. Distribution of risk-seeking choices by probability (Experiment 1). Mean 
values are proportions. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of mean. 
Figure 3. Certainty equivalent proportions by monetary amount (Experiment 1). 
Mean values are proportions. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of mean. 
Figure 4. Two-parameter probability-weighting functions based on average estimates 
of participants’ CE (Experiment 3). 
Figure 5. Distribution of risk-seeking choices by probability (Experiment 3). Mean 
values are proportions. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of mean. 
Figure 6. Certainty equivalent proportions by experimental condition (Experiment 3). 
Mean values are proportions. A certainty equivalent of 1.0 corresponds with an 
amount of £600. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of mean.  
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 Figure 1. 
Note. Median values. Two-parameter models.
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Note. Median values. Two-parameter models. 
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